How do large internet entities such as internet service providers (ISPs), cloud providers and national networks communicate with each other? They use border gateway protocol (BGP).

The problem is that, as noted by Bleeping Computer, BGP security is lacking. The protocol was developed in the late 1980s, when data security wasn’t top of mind for emerging internet entities. As a result, BGP hijacks are now, as Wired put it, “the internet’s biggest security hole.” This prompted two government agencies — the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) — to team up and develop a new set of security standards to close border gateway loopholes.

Breaking Borders

So what’s in a BGP breach? The idea is to subvert BGP’s purpose. When one large network needs to route data to another, BGP tells routers which IP blocks are available on the destination network and which are the most reliable.

Fraudsters can compromise this process by advertising available IP blocks that don’t actually exist on legitimate networks. Data is then sent directly to attacker-controlled routers and servers.

Even worse, BGP lacks basic security services. Enterprises may not be aware that data security has been compromised because no errors would have been reported. Information is sent somewhere without incident — the destination is simply altered.

Joining Forces for BGP Security

NIST and DHS are no strangers to teaming up. As noted by the official NIST website, the two agencies are jointly sponsoring the 2018 Global City Teams Challenge, which aims to improve the security, resiliency and reliability of smart city systems.

For BGP security, NIST and DHS created the Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) framework, which has been in development for several years but just recently began rolling out on the Internet Engineerinng Task Force (ITEF) portal. To effectively secure BGP routing, SIDR leverages three components:

• Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This allows providers that hold large blocks of internet addresses to stipulate which networks can announce a direct address block connection, reducing the chance of cybercriminal networks calling the shots.
• BGP Origin Validation. Using RPKI information, routers can filter out route announcements that aren’t from authorized locations.
• BGP Path Validation. Also called BGPsec, the idea here is to use digital router signatures to ensure that traffic only crosses authorized networks. This kind of path monitoring should help eliminate the ability of attackers to carry out undetected hijacks.

This isn’t a matter of scaling up existing BGP security — it’s about creating a solid foundation after the fact. The NIST/DHS effort gives organizations a starting point for BGP security that, if widely implemented, should help eliminate the majority of border gateway attacks.